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ABSTRACT
At least since Arrow (1962), the effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied, but
there has been little analysis of the effect of appropriability on the commercialization of existing inventions.
Exploiting a database of 805 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions licensed from
MIT between 1980 and 1996, we explore the influence of several appropriability mechanisms on the
commercialization and termination of projects to develop products based on university inventions.
Our central hypothesis is that the relationship between a licensee's decision to either terminate or commercialize
the invention is driven by the current market value of the invention, as well as the option value of delaying
its commercialization. We use a competing risks framework that allows for non- parametric heterogeneity
and correlated risks. We find that better appropriability in the sense of more effective patent strength
and secrecy has a strong negative effect on the hazard of license termination. The effectiveness of
learning has a strong positive effect on the hazard of technology commercialization, while lead time
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Do strong intellectual property rights enhance the commercialization of new technology?
Surprisingly, we do not know the answer to this question (Gallini 2002). Although the
role of property rights in innovation has been studied extensively since Arrow (1962) ar-
gued that ¯rms under invest in R&D because they cannot fully appropriate the returns,
much of this work focuses on the e®ect of intellectual property rights, particularly those
associated with patents, on inventive activity. Moreover, while there is a rich literature
on the determinants of licensing activity (Thursby and Thursby 2007), there has been
little analysis of whether licensed inventions are commercialized, or the e®ects of ap-
propriability mechanisms on these outcomes (Hahn 2003). As ¯rms increasingly rely on
externally generated inventions, particularly those invented and patented by universities,
this represents an important gap in our understanding (Arora et al. 2001, Santoro and
Chakrabarti 2002, Thursby and Thursby 2003).
We examine the e®ect of various appropriability mechanisms on the commercializa-
tion of university inventions by exploring the same population of inventions licensed
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) used in Shane's (2002) work on
the determinants of licensing. Speci¯cally, we examine the population of 805 attempts
by private ¯rms to commercialize patentable inventions licensed from the MIT between
1980 and 1996. For these inventions, we relate appropriability mechanisms to the timing
of termination and commercialization decisions.
We view the decision of a licensing ¯rm as an optimal stopping problem under un-
certainty (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994). This uncertainty stems from the embryonic
nature of university technologies and the di±culty in identifying and protecting associ-
ated markets (Thursby and Thursby 2002, Shane 2000). Survey evidence from university
technology licensing o±ces (TLO) shows that the majority of inventions licensed are no
more than a lab scale prototype at the time of license (Jensen and Thursby 2001 and
Thursby et al. 2001). Thus, for most university inventions, further development is needed
for commercial application. Survey evidence from businesses that license-in university
inventions shows that this development is risky: half of all commercialization e®orts fail
and 47% of these failures can be attributed to technical reasons (Thursby and Thursby
2003).
Market uncertainty is an additional source of risk for nascent university technologies.
De¯ning market opportunities for early stage inventions is di±cult, so much so that
many university inventions end up with applications that are not anticipated at the time
3of license (Shane 2000, and Thursby and Thursby 2002). Further, exclusive licenses such
as those we consider, do not necessarily prevent competitors from developing substitutes
or inventing around a licensed patent.
In this context, we consider the fact that at every point in time the licensee can
decide to either commercialize; drop the license; or keep the license but delay commer-
cialization. This gives rise to a real option in commercialization. Moreover, returns may
be appropriated using a variety of mechanisms. While some of these are legal, such as
patents or trade secrets, others, such as learning or a ¯rst mover advantage, are con-
sequences of business strategy (Cohen et al. 2000, Kamien and Schwartz 1972, Levin
et al. 1987, and Takalo and Kanniainen 2000). In our theoretical discussion, we argue
that di®erent appropriability mechanisms in°uence the timing of licensees' decisions by
a®ecting either the current market value of commercializing the invention, the option
value of keeping the license without commercialization, or both.
Estimation of the hazard rates of termination of the license and commercialization of
the invention reveals that legal mechanisms have a strong and negative e®ect on the haz-
ard of termination. However, with the exception of patent scope, they have only a weak
e®ect on the hazard of commercialization. The reverse is true for appropriability mecha-
nisms based on business strategy, which primarily a®ect the hazard of commercialization.
These results are consistent with our theoretical arguments, under the assumption that
most university technologies are embryonic. They are also in line with the observation
that when appropriability mechanisms such as patents and secrecy are e®ective, ¯rms
may be able to appropriate returns from the license without commercializing a product.
By showing that several dimensions of appropriability a®ect the hazards of license
termination and invention commercialization, we contribute to the literature on appro-
priability and innovation. In particular, our results on patent strength contribute to
the extensive literature on patents and innovation (for a survey, see Gallini 2002). By
treating the decision to commercialize an invention as an optimal stopping problem, we
examine patent scope and innovation in a way that incorporates the possibility of ter-
mination, which, though quite relevant to embryonic technologies licensed to ¯rms, has
been ignored in the literature.
Furthermore, we contribute to the empirical literature on the e®ectiveness of patents
in appropriating the returns from R&D by directly examining the relationship between
patent characteristics and the development of products based on newly invented tech-
nologies, rather than relying on perceptions of R&D personnel responding to surveys
(Taylor and Silberston 1973, Mans¯eld 1986, and Mans¯eld et al. 1981).
4Our analysis also extends the literature on product development and management.
For example, Lilien and Yoon (1990) and Bayus et al. (1997) show that it may be optimal
for market pioneers to delay product launch depending on demand characteristics, as well
as market competition. Our results on commercialization contribute to this literature by
relating the hazard of commercialization to appropriability mechanisms. In this regard,
we also contribute to the literature on commercialization strategy. For example, Gans,
Hsu and Stern (2003) examine whether innovative startup ¯rms commercialize their
innovations independently or by partnering with other ¯rms as a function of patent rights,
secrecy, or the litigation environment. Both our theoretical discussion and our empirical
results add to this line of inquiry by considering other measures of appropriability and
the timing of independent commercialization.
Finally, we contribute to the practice of technology management and strategy by
highlighting the fact that the intuitive tradeo® between current market value and op-
tion value depends strongly on appropriability conditions. An important implication,
validated by the empirical analysis, is that in lines of business where learning is an
e®ective means of appropriating returns, the current market value tends to dominate
and inventions are brought to market quickly. By contrast, in lines of business where
being a ¯rst mover is e®ective, delays in commercialization may occur because of the
option value associated with further product development. Given the increasing reliance
of ¯rms on externally-generated inventions, particularly those developed in universities,
this information should be useful to managers in technology-intensive industries.
Section 2 presents our theoretical arguments on the relation of appropriability mecha-
nisms to the timing of a licensee's decisions and the hazards of termination and commer-
cialization. The competing risk hazard model used in the empirical analysis is described
in Section 3, and details about our data are provided in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the main results, as well as a variety of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Appropriability mechanisms, termination and com-
mercialization
In our analysis, the timing of termination and commercialization is determined by the
licensee's optimal decisions when faced with market value uncertainty. Hence, it is
natural to consider the conditional probability that either event (commercialization and
termination) occurs in time t given that no event has occurred before, that is, the hazards
5of commercialization and termination. In the simplest formulation of the problem, given
that the ¯rm has not yet commercialized, the value of the license to the ¯rm will be a
function
Vt(¦t;bt;ct);
where ¦t is the current expected value to the ¯rm of cumulated pro¯ts from commercial-
izing the invention (net of licensing fees) or market value, bt is the bene¯t from holding
the license without commercializing, and ct is the cost of keeping the license for one
additional period without commercializing. This cost may include development costs
and surely includes the sum of license fees owed to the university, with the exception
of royalties based on sales. The market value, ¦t, the other bene¯ts, bt, and the value
function Vt depend on the e®ectiveness of appropriability mechanisms such as patent
strength, scope and other non-patent mechanisms. They also depend on the amount of
time the licensee has been able to spend on development, as well as potentially complex
aspects of the product life cycle. The expected value of Vt may thus be non-monotonic
as a function of time.
Importantly, we consider that the value of the license Vt may depend on bene¯ts
that are derived from keeping the license, but are unrelated to commercialization (bt).
Firms may license patented inventions in order to build \fences" around products they
already produce or to increase their bargaining power in obtaining cross licenses, as
well as to earn royalty income (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000, and Arora et
al. 2007). In fact, university TLO personnel often express concerns over these motives
for licensing and report that the contracts they use in exclusive licensing include due
diligence requirements as well as complicated payment terms to discourage ¯rms from
shelving the technologies licensed (Dechenaux et al. 2007). Keeping the license without
commercializing does not necessarily stem from a pure shelving motive. Note that if
property rights are weak (e.g., in electronics or mechanical engineering inventions) the
licensee might keep a license until critical knowledge is transferred, but then terminate the
license and invent around the patent.1 Moreover, this implies that a terminated license
may not indicate either lack of technology transfer or technology failure (Goldfarb and
Henrekson 2003).
In any period, the licensee will choose not to terminate the license as long as Vt
is greater than zero. Note that V0 > 0 must hold for all licenses in the sample since
the ¯rms voluntarily obtained the license from the university. However, the licensee's
1Katharine Ku, head of the Stanford O±ce of Technology Licensing has indicated to the authors
that not only does this happen, but it is considered fair-play and not at all unethical.
6decision regarding commercialization depends on the di®erence between expected pro¯ts
from immediate commercialization and the option option value of delaying (Takalo and
Kanniainen 2000).
Our analysis focuses on how changes in appropriability conditions can a®ect Vt and
the di®erence between current market value (cash-°ow e®ect) and the option value of
commercialization (option e®ect). We make a distinction between appropriability mech-
anisms that require commercialization and those for which rents may be appropriated
without commercializing a product. Further, we distinguish between mechanisms that
are legal and those related to business strategy. In the next subsections, we discuss these
e®ects. (For a more formal treatment, the reader is referred to the Appendix.)
2.1 Patent strength, patent scope, and secrecy
These three appropriability mechanisms pertain to legal means of protecting intellectual
property. Based on Mans¯eld et al.'s (1981) study of patents and imitation costs, it is
natural to think of both patent strength and patent scope as raising the cost of imitating
the licensed technology. Secrecy should have the same e®ect. Hence, an increase in the
e®ectiveness of these mechanisms should result in a higher value for the license, via both
the market value and the option of holding the license.
Ceteris paribus, we would expect an increase in patent strength, patent scope, or
secrecy to reduce the hazard of termination. This logic should apply whether or not
the licensee intends to commercialize the technology; that is, the legal mechanisms of
appropriating returns may provide as much or more value from preemption or cross
licensing as they do from discouraging imitation of a newly developed product (Arora et
al. 2007, Arora and Ceccagnoli 2007).
The dependence of the hazard of commercialization on the speci¯c appropriability
mechanism is not as straightforward to characterize. Each legal mechanism increases
imitation costs and therefore decreases the probability of imitation. This increases both
the market and option values since the ¯rm has a longer window to continue devel-
opment without competition (Kamien and Schwartz 1972 and Takalo and Kanniainen
2000). The increase in market value should increase the hazard of commercialization,
while the option e®ect works against it. We must note that in Matutes et al.'s (1996)
model, greater scope decreases an innovating ¯rm's incentives to delay the introduc-
tion of applications, while a longer patent leads to increased delays. An earlier result
by Reinganum (1982) shows that perfect patent protection accelerates development and
thus market introduction.
7Note further, for ¯rms that have licensed the invention to block rivals, the e®ect of
the option value is, indeed, the only relevant e®ect. This e®ect may also be relatively
more important when secrecy is e®ective, particularly if the technology is closely related
to existing technology used by the licensee. Indeed, letting a rival ¯rm obtain the license
may lead to disclosure of important information because license agreements often include
the possibility for the licensee to work closely with the inventor (Jensen and Thursby
2001 and Dechenaux et al. 2007).
2.2 Learning
Learning allows the licensee to obtain a signi¯cant cost advantage in the product market,
and thus, make imitation less pro¯table. This advantage is achieved by decreasing the
cost of producing a given level of quality over time and thus, requires early commercial-
ization. For this reason, we argue that when returns are appropriated through learning,
the value of the license derives mainly from the current market value, while the option
value of delaying commercialization is low.
How the e®ectiveness of learning a®ects termination is ambiguous. If greater e®ec-
tiveness of learning were simply to reduce the option value of holding the license (all
other things being equal) we would expect learning to increase termination. However,
when learning is e®ective, the licensee likely derives a cost advantage in the product
market, implying a lower probability of successful imitation. The latter e®ect would
decrease the hazard of termination.
In contrast, learning is unlikely to a®ect the hazard of commercialization unless the li-
censee intends to commercialize the technology. Therefore, the expected e®ect of learning
on the hazard of commercialization is straightforward. In order to bene¯t from learning
the ¯rm must commercialize, therefore, ceteris paribus, learning is likely to increase the
hazard of commercialization.
2.3 Lead time
The licensee's lead time, or the amount of time before entry by the ¯rst competitor, is
likely to be used to appropriate returns di®erently across inventions. For instance, lead
time may be used to establish a brand name, or develop and secure bene¯cial relationships
with large customers. Such e®orts would lower the impact of future entry on the ¯rst
mover's pro¯t. If, however, lead time is used to get a head start on competitors, then
its e®ectiveness depends on the quality of the commercialized product, and thus, the
8amount of time spent on development. Hence, the relationship between lead time, cash
°ow, and option e®ects is not straightforward to characterize.
We expect lead time to be important only to those licensees who have licensed the
technology with the goal of commercializing it. If lead time is an e®ective appropriability
mechanism simply because exploiting ¯rst mover advantage decreases the probability
of imitation, then an increase in lead time should reduce the hazard of termination.
However, if lead time is an e®ective appropriability mechanism only when the licensee
manages to capture a signi¯cant share of the market as the ¯rst mover, the development
costs could become too high for the licensee to consider it worthwhile to continue.
The e®ect of lead time on commercialization is also ambiguous. For an invention
that is ready for commercialization, then, conditional on no rival having entered yet, the
potential ¯rst mover advantage should be re°ected in the current market value. However,
as Lilian and Yoon (1990) argue, a ¯rm developing a new product will bene¯t from ¯rst
mover advantage (consumer lock-in, strong bargaining position with suppliers, etc.) only
if its product is of su±ciently high quality (see also Bayus et al. 1997 and Benoit 1987).
With this added quali¯cation, the ¯rst mover advantage for embryonic inventions will
be re°ected in the option value of the license, but not necessarily in the market value.
Thus for such inventions, the greater the importance of lead time, the lower the hazard
of commercialization.
2.4 Summary of predictions
Before turning to the empirical analysis of the hazards, we summarize our predictions in
Table 1 below. The table relates appropriability measures to the cash-°ow and option
e®ects and provides our predictions for the e®ect of appropriability mechanisms on the
hazards of termination and commercialization.
3 Empirical methodology
Although the cash-°ow and option e®ects taken together have ambiguous e®ects on
the hazards, the panel nature of our data allows us to explore which e®ect dominates,
on average, for our data. We observe a set of MIT inventions, their licensees, and
termination and commercialization outcomes. We observe each observation until one of
these events, or until it is right censored by the closing of our observation window. Our
data re°ect the two central competing risks about which we theorize, and we need to
9Table 1: Predictions: Appropriability measures and hazards of termination and com-
mercialization
Hazard of
Cash-°ow e®ect Option E®ect Termination Commercialization
Strength + + ¡ +=¡¤
Scope + + ¡ +=¡
Secrecy + + ¡ +=¡
Learning + ¡ ¡=+ +
Lead-time¤¤
Embryonic ¡ + +=¡ ¡
Late stage + ¡ ¡=+ +
¤a=b indicates that the direction of the overall e®ect is given by a if the
cash-°ow e®ect dominates the option e®ect and by b otherwise.
¤¤Depends on the stage of development.
control for the empirical reality of right-censoring. Thus, we adopt a competing risks
framework. As we discuss below, we might expect a signi¯cant amount of heterogeneity
among MIT inventions, which may be di±cult to control for. With this in mind, the
framework we adopt allows for non-parametric heterogeneity.
Let Tf be the duration of a patent that is licensed until ¯rst sale and Td be the
duration of a license until it is terminated. De¯ne T = min(Tf;Td) and let df be an
indicator which equals 1 if a patented technology is commercialized (¯rst sale) and 0
otherwise. Let dd be an indicator which equals 1 if a patented technology is terminated
and 0 otherwise. Only (T;df;dd) are observed. Because df and dd are observed, exclusion
restrictions are not necessary to uncover the latent survival functions, S (kf;kdjx) so long
as there is su±cient variation in the vector of regressors x (Abbring and van den Berg
2000, Han and Hausman 1990). Since our data are discrete, we employ a grouped data
approach (Han and Hausman 1990). Our model follows McCall (1996).
The probability of a license being terminated conditional on no events occurring
through period k ¡ 1 is:
Pr(Td = kjX;T > k ¡ 1) = 1 ¡ exp(¡µd exp(®dk + ¯
0
dx)); (1)
10where x is a set of exogenous (possibly) time-varying regressors. Similarly,
Pr(Tf = kjX;T > k ¡ 1) = 1 ¡ exp(¡µf exp(®fk + ¯
0
fx)); (2)
is the probability a ¯rst sale associated with a patent occurs conditional on no events
occurring through period k ¡ 1. Period subscripts on x are dropped for readability.
Because the theory does not provide us with guidance as to possible exclusion restrictions,
we assume that regressors x are identical in both equations.
























where hw(t) is the underlying baseline hazard function and w 2 ff;dg. ®dk and ®fk are
the respective baseline hazards and are assumed to follow a 3rd order polynomial. A
3rd order polynomial is su±ciently °exible to approximate a baseline hazard function of
only ¯ve periods. Thus
®wk = ®0k + ®1kk + ®2kk
2 + ®3kk
3: (4)
The vectors of parameters ¯w represent the e®ects of the exogenous variables. Note
that all covariates are constant except patent age and year. De¯ne
Pf(k) = S(k ¡ 1;k ¡ 1j£) ¡ S(k;k ¡ 1j£) ¡ 0:5[S(k ¡ 1;k ¡ 1j£) + S(k;kj£)
¡ S(k ¡ 1;kj£) ¡ S(k;k ¡ 1)j£];
Pd(k) = S(k ¡ 1;k ¡ 1j£) ¡ S(k ¡ 1;kj£) ¡ 0:5[S(k ¡ 1;k ¡ 1j£) + S(k;kj£)
¡ S(k ¡ 1;kj£) ¡ S(k;k ¡ 1)j£];
Pc(k) = S(k ¡ 1;k ¡ 1j£);
where Pf(k) is the unconditional probability of ¯rst sale by the beginning of period k,
Pd(k) is the unconditional probability of a license being terminated by the beginning of
period k, and Pc(k) is the unconditional probability of neither event occurring through
11the beginning of period k. An adjustment, 0:5[S(k ¡ 1;k ¡ 1j£) + S(k;kj£) ¡ S(k ¡
1;kj£) ¡ S(k;k ¡ 1j£)] is made because durations are measured in discrete time.
A key problem with competing risks models identi¯ed in the literature is that when
the risks are not allowed to correlate, a potential bias may arise. Unobserved determi-
nants of one event (¯rst sale) may be correlated with unobserved determinants of the
complementary event (termination) and duration (decision to do neither). We might
expect unobserved components, such as quality of the patent and uncertainty associated
with success of the technology, to a®ect both decisions. In our speci¯cation, we allow
risks to correlate by permitting a three mass-point distribution of location parameter
pairs µdj;µfj where j = 1;2;3. Each pair occurs with probability pj. The six location


























for each of the Kn periods of each of the N attempts.
To identify the model, the baseline hazards ®f0 and ®d0 are ¯xed to zero. As there
is no constant in the regression, we use deviations from the means in x.
4 Data
The data used to test the model's predictions were collected from the MIT TLO. Our
sample includes all patented inventions made by faculty, sta® and students at MIT
that were assigned to the Institute between 1980 and 1996 and subsequently licensed
exclusively to at least one private sector ¯rm. Our unit of analysis is the license. There
were 805 exclusive licenses and 2,875 periods in which licenses were at risk. While it
is plausible that licenses are terminated after commercialization, the MIT TLO reports
that this is a rare event, and hence this information was not collected. That is, we only
observe the ¯rst event that occurs. The analysis below predicts the likelihood of the ¯rst
event.
Our data set is an unbalanced, right censored panel. We have yearly data for each
12attempt from the date of the contractual agreement on the patent until one of three
events occurs: it is right censored (in 1996), it is terminated or it is commercialized. The
data include the date of termination if the license is terminated and the date of ¯rst sale
if an invention is commercialized. An observation begins the year that MIT TLO records
indicate that a ¯rm ¯rst licensed a patent. We code TERMINATION as zero, except
in the year (if any) that MIT TLO records indicate that the licensing agreement by the
given ¯rm no longer covered the invention or if the patent expired, thereby negating the
license. We code FIRSTSALE as zero, except in the year (if any) that MIT TLO records
indicate that the ¯rst dollar of sales from a product or service embodying the invention
was achieved. Our discussions with MIT personnel indicate that record keeping was
quite good, hence we are con¯dent our data is an accurate representation of reality.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics. In our data, only 49 of the inventions were
commercialized within the ¯rst year of the license and the overwhelming majority were
never commercialized. Roughly 40% of the licenses were terminated during the period.2
Table 3 reports the unconditional survival rates and the extent of right censoring
in the sample. It shows that ¯rms are far more likely to terminate licenses of patents
than to successfully commercialize them (323 terminations vs. 197 successes). The table
also suggests that uncertainty associated with an innovation is generally resolved in the
¯rst 5 years of license because 85% of licenses either lead to commercialization or are
terminated by the end of period 5, and 90% of the observed events occur in the ¯rst ¯ve
periods.3 The sparseness of this right tail implies that there is little information on which
to estimate a baseline hazard. Therefore, we recoded all observations that survived more
than ¯ve periods as right censored after ¯ve periods. The majority (257) are censored
during the ¯rst four years of the license due to the closing of our observation window in
1996. In addition to the observations that are right-censored after 1996, we censored an
additional 74 observations.
4.1 Measures of appropriability
As measures of importance of the appropriability mechanisms used in a line of business,
we employ four measures from the Yale survey on innovation: patent strength, secrecy,
lead time and learning (Levin et al. 1985, Levin et al. 1987). These measures are survey
line of business averages. They re°ect perceptions of 650 high-level R&D managers in
130 lines of business about central tendencies of the e®ectiveness of di®erent mechanisms
2Note that remaining patent life re°ects the mean remaining life of patents at the time of license.
3We observe only 2 events after period 10.
13used to appropriate the returns to innovation for process or product R&D in their lines
of business. The managers were asked to rate mechanisms on seven point Likert scales.
To ensure the reliability and validity of their survey, the scholars who conducted the
Yale survey pretested their survey with managers from diverse businesses. In addition,
to mitigate intra-industry heterogeneity, the respondents were asked to identify major
innovations in their industry, and there was not signi¯cant variation in responses to
this question within industries. Because of their reliability and validity, the measures
have been used in several subsequent studies (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Levin et al.,
1987). However, as Griliches (1987) pointed out, the measures for lead time and learning
are less objective than those for patent characteristics or secrecy (see \Comments and
Discussion" in Levin et al. 1987).
The items are constructed from responses to the following question posed both for
production processes and products: \In this line of business, how e®ective is each of
the following means of capturing and protecting the competitive advantages of new or
improved products (production processes)". Respondents answered on a seven point
Likert scale from \not at all e®ective" to \very e®ective".
Patent strength is a measure of the e®ectiveness of patents as a way to capture and
protect competitive advantage in a line of business. It is created from the average re-
sponse for production processes and products for two means of appropriability: \patents
to prevent competitors from duplicating the product (process)" and \patents to secure
royalty income". Secrecy is a measure of the e®ectiveness of keeping key information
secret as a way to capture and protect competitive advantage in a line of business. It
is created from the average response for production processes and products to \secrecy"
as a means of capturing and protecting the competitive advantages of new or improved
production processes (products). Lead time is a measure of the e®ectiveness of being an
early mover as a way to capture and protect competitive advantage in a line of business.
It is created from the average response for production processes and products to \lead
time (being ¯rst with a new process [product])". Learning is a measure of the e®ec-
tiveness of moving ahead of competitors on the learning curve as a way to capture and
protect the competitive advantages in a line of business. It is created from the average
response for production processes and products to \moving quickly down the learning
curve".
Relating our data to the Yale Survey measures of appropriability (described in Section
2) raises an important empirical issue. Because our sample covers the years 1980-1996,
while the survey measures appropriability conditions at a particular point in time, we
14must assume that the appropriability di®erences between lines of business are relatively
stable throughout our observation period. There is some evidence that cross-industry
di®erences in such factors in appropriability do not vary signi¯cantly over time, as they
are a function of the underlying technology in a line of business (Cohen and Levin
1989). Although one might argue that the absolute strength of patents increased during
the period, the intellectual property protection a®orded by patents for, say, chemical
compounds remains very strong relative to that for electronic devices.
We also employ Lerner's (1994) measure of patent scope, which is based upon the
number of international patent classi¯cations found on the patent. Lerner (1994) ¯nds
that this measure is associated with various measures of economic importance: ¯rm
valuation, likelihood of patent litigation, and citations. He argues that it represents
broader scope of the monopoly rights covered by the patents. In contrast to the Yale
measures, this variable is patent speci¯c.
4.2 Control variables
The fact that we do not observe many licenses extending beyond 5 years without a
commercialization or termination event does not imply that uncertainty is resolved within
¯ve years of issuance of a patent. It is common for licenses to be initiated and survive
well into patent life before ¯rst sale or termination (Table 4). We measure REMAINING
PATENT LIFE as seventeen minus the number of years since the patent was issued,
conditional on patent issue at time of license. This variation in the remaining life of a
patent at the time of license allows us to separately control for the e®ects of the age of
the license and the remaining time of formal patent protection on the hazards of ¯rst sale
and termination. The former are measured by the baseline hazard estimates, while the
latter are measured by the coe±cients on REMAINING PATENT LIFE. Some patents
were licensed prior to patent grant. We code the REMAINING PATENT LIFE as 17 for
these patents until grant - at which time the clock begins. The patent grant clari¯es the
property right (Murray and Stern 2007), and might in°uence decision making. Indeed,
we ¯nd that the grant has a signi¯cant (negative) e®ect on termination, though none on
commercialization. Controlling for this does not in°uence the other coe±cients. As this
is tangential to our analysis, it is omitted from these regressions.
We also include TECHNOLOGY CLASS dummies. Following the Hall, Ja®e, and
Trajtenberg (2001) classi¯cation of patents, we break the patents into ¯ve categories:
drugs, electronics (including computers and communications), chemicals, mechanical,
and other because we might expect di®erent types of technology to take longer to reach
15¯rst sale, as is the case for drugs, which need to ¯rst obtain FDA approval.
Reduced form hazard ratios suggest that event patterns in the various categories are
distinct. For example, licenses of drug patents tend to survive longer than other types of
inventions. That said, these technology class controls are relatively crude, and moreover,
the Yale appropriability measures are associated with lines of business, which are, in turn,
mapped to the patents via their primary three-digit US patent classes. Hence, there
is no variation in the Yale appropriability measures within three-digit patent classes.
This leads to concerns that the appropriability measures will proxy for technological
heterogeneity. While we cannot eliminate this possibility entirely, we explore it in detail
in the next section.
We also include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the patent was licensed
to a startup, de¯ned as a ¯rm formed to license the particular technology (33% of the
patents in our sample were licensed to startups). We also include a dummy variable that
indicates whether the research that led to the patented invention was funded by industry.
(16.8% of the patents were the result of industry funded research.) Industry funding does
not, however, imply that the ¯rm that funded the research necessarily was the licensee.
While research sponsors are not generally a®orded special licensing rights, in practice
we might expect them to be aware of research results earlier than non-sponsors. We are
unable to identify cases in which sponsors licensed the output of research they funded
because we do not observe the identity of the research sponsors.
5 Empirical results
Our results are reported in Table 5. Our unit of observation is a license. In university
licensing, several patents may be licensed in a single agreement. If there are many such
cases, and they re°ect instances in which a single technology is protected through mul-
tiple patents, our regressions would overweight these technologies. If such technologies
are systematically di®erent than those licensed through single patents, then this pattern
would introduce a bias into our analysis. This problem could be mitigated by allowing
the error terms to be correlated within each agreement. Unfortunately, we are not aware
of a method to implement this strategy and simultaneously control for unobserved het-
erogeneity. Because we believe that unobserved heterogeneity is a greater problem than
the overweighting of technologies represented by multiple patents, we choose to control
16for unobserved heterogeneity in our analyses.4
We estimate several regressions, and in so doing investigate the general robustness of
our results. In all reported models, we include year dummies to control for technology
vintage. Our results are generally robust to the omission of vintage controls.
In model 5a, we report results of a model that includes all of the appropriability
measures. We ¯nd that PATENT STRENGTH is negatively related to the hazard of
license termination. Although the coe±cient on PATENT SCOPE is negative, it is not
signi¯cant at conventional levels. Thus, we ¯nd some support for our prediction that
appropriability measures directly related to patents will reduce termination hazards. In
contrast, we ¯nd that PATENT STRENGTH has no measurable e®ect on the hazard of
commercialization, but PATENT SCOPE has a strong, highly signi¯cant e®ect on this
hazard. We ¯nd no measurable relationship between PATENT STRENGTH and inven-
tion commercialization. Recalling Table 1, either the cash-°ow and option e®ects wash
each other out, or alternatively, there is no relationship. However, the strong positive
relationship between PATENT SCOPE and commercialization hints that the cash-°ow
e®ect is dominant. This conclusion is reinforced by the results regarding SECRECY
and LEARNING. As predicted by our theory, we ¯nd that SECRECY is negatively and
signi¯cantly related to TERMINATION. We also ¯nd that SECRECY is positively and
signi¯cantly related to COMMERCIALIZATION, which is consistent with the suggestion
that cash-°ow e®ects are, on average, dominant. While the point estimate for LEARN-
ING is negative in the termination equation, it is not signi¯cant at conventional levels.
We precisely measure a positive relationship between LEARNING and the hazard of
commercialization, as predicted by our theory. Note that the theory generated ambigu-
ous predictions for two of the three coe±cients that empirically we fail to measure with
precision (PATENT SCOPE and LEARNING in the termination equation and PATENT
STRENGTH in the commercialization equation). We ¯nd a positive relationship (at the
10% level) between LEAD TIME and termination and a negative relationship between
this measure and commercialization (at the 5% level). The combined termination and
commercialization results suggest that, for inventions in lines of business in which LEAD
TIME is e®ective, the current market value is low, most likely because of the need for
4We might also average patent characteristics within a license. However, this would create a problem
as large as the one it was intended to solve. Averaging would leave us unable to accommodate the
cases in which one of the licensed patents was either commercialized or terminated separately from
the rest of the patents under the license agreement, which we observe in a signi¯cant number of cases.
Moreover, discussions with the director of the MIT TLO indicates that separate termination is a common
occurrence and is represented by several anecdotes in the \lay" theory of technology transfer o±cers
about how to think about these data.
17further development. As per Table 1, in the case of commercialization, assuming that
inventions are embryonic, both the cash °ow and option e®ects reinforce each other.
We explore the robustness of these results in models 5b-5f. In model 5b, we introduce
controls for whether the licensee was a startup and whether the research that generated
the patent was funded by industry. A log likelihood test rejects the null hypothesis
that these four coe±cients are jointly zero (LR statistic = 11.50). Both STARTUP
and INDUSTRY FUNDED are negatively related to termination (the former result is
consistent with ¯ndings of Lowe and Ziedonis 2006). Our results remain unchanged
except that we no longer measure a relationship between LEAD TIME and termination.
Further (unreported) analysis indicates that this is due to the inclusion of the STARTUP
control, which suggests that our measured positive relationship between LEAD TIME
and termination is the result of underlying negative correlation between LEAD TIME
and startups, who tend to license technologies where LEAD TIME is a less important
appropriability mechanism. In model 5c, we include 4 broad technology class dummies.
When these dummies are included, PATENT STRENGTH and PATENT SCOPE are
signi¯cantly related to both termination and commercialization. In this model, PATENT
SCOPE becomes signi¯cant (and negative) at the 10% level in the termination equation
and PATENT STRENGTH becomes positive and signi¯cant in the commercialization
equation.
It was not possible to estimate a more parsimonious model that simultaneously ex-
cluded class, age, and year controls, included a 3-point mass structure, and a cubic
form for the baseline hazard. We suspect such a model is not properly identi¯ed due to
insu±cient variation in the data (see Abbring and van den Berg 2000).
With the exception of PATENT SCOPE, our measures of appropriability vary at the
level of line of business, as opposed to level of the patent. And while our results are
una®ected, or even strengthened by the inclusion of broad technology class dummies,
these dummies are only coarse proxies for technology class. Thus, as mentioned earlier,
our appropriability measures may pick up unobserved heterogeneity across technology
classes and this heterogeneity may drive our results, as opposed to underlying variation
in appropriability mechanisms across individual technologies. While controlling non-
parametrically for unobserved heterogeneity should alleviate some of these concerns, we
conduct three further tests to explore this possibility.
First, if our measures of appropriability are indeed measuring appropriability, their
e®ects should weaken as a patent ages. In model 5d we include the interactions of RE-
MAINING PATENT LIFE with both PATENT STRENGTH and PATENT SCOPE.
18We no longer measure direct relationships between PATENT SCOPE and either ter-
mination and commercialization. However, the interaction of PATENT SCOPE and
REMAINING PATENT LIFE is positive and signi¯cant, which suggests that the e®ect
that we found in models 5a, 5b and 5c - in which scope is positively related to commer-
cialization - is driven by the younger patents. The main PATENT STRENGTH e®ect
is qualitatively unchanged in both equations. In this model we also ¯nd a marginally
signi¯cant relationship between the interaction of REMAINING PATENT LIFE and
PATENT STRENGTH, however this result is not robust (see model 5e).
In model 5e, we include a measure of REMAINING PATENT LIFE as well as that
variable's interactions with PATENT STRENGTH and PATENT SCOPE. REMAINING
PATENT LIFE, in itself, should have no e®ect on termination or commercialization
unless the patents are strong. This leads us to expect only the interaction terms to be
signi¯cant. However, REMAINING PATENT LIFE is also a proxy for the age of the
technology (as opposed to the age of the license, which is captured by the baseline hazard
rate or vintage of the license, which is captured in by the year dummies). Presumably,
older technologies have more substitutes which could explain the greater likelihood of
termination associated with older patents.
We ¯nd only the main (positive) patent strength - commercialization ¯nding remains
signi¯cant. However, we also ¯nd that the coe±cient on REMAINING PATENT LIFE
interacted with PATENT STRENGTH is negative and signi¯cant. This suggests that
the main negative relationship found between strength and termination in models 5a, 5b
and 5c is driven by younger patents. In addition, as in model 5d, we ¯nd the coe±cient
REMAINING PATENT LIFE interacted with PATENT SCOPE to be signi¯cant in the
commercialization equation. Thus, these results are consistent with the premise that the
appropriability measures are indeed measuring di®erences in appropriability rather then
technological heterogeneity.
Second, we explore the e®ect of assuming homogeneity. If the appropriability mea-
sures are simply picking up unobserved heterogeneity, then these measures should have
greater predictive power in a restricted model. In Model 5f, we restrict the risks to be
independent, and do not allow unobserved heterogeneity. We strongly reject the hy-
pothesis that there is no unobserved heterogeneity and independent risks (LR statistic
= 108.52). While the sign of each coe±cient is never reversed, we no longer measure any
relationship between PATENT SCOPE or its interaction with REMAINING PATENT
LIFE and either termination of commercialization. Indeed, only LEARNING is a sig-
ni¯cant predictor of commercialization. PATENT STRENGTH, SECRECY, and LEAD
19TIME remain signi¯cant predictors of termination. Thus, the data suggest that unob-
served heterogeneity is an important characteristic of our data. Failing to control for this
obfuscates our central results. To understand the intuition behind this result, consider
that, in Model 5c we found that the hazard of termination decreases if the technology
is licensed to a STARTUP, but the hazard of commercialization does not. By contrast,
in Model 5f, we ¯nd no e®ect. The sensitivity of the result for STARTUP to controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity is what one might expect if start-ups not only di®er from
well-established ¯rms, but also license inventions that are di®erent from those licensed
by established ¯rms. For example, if startups license earlier and riskier inventions, but
are more reluctant to terminate the license (because terminating the license agreements
might imply terminating the startups as well), then these two e®ects would tend to cancel
out. However, after controlling for this heterogeneity, then Model 5c shows that startup
¯rms are more likely than other licensees to terminate the development projects.
Third, we estimated a model with class controls at a lower level of aggregation. In
particular, we estimated a variant of Model 5f, using 24 patent classes as controls and
pooling the remainder. The data do not support this speci¯cation fully: only for patent
classes in which there are a su±ciently high number of observations, can we include
patent class dummies and 86 of the 108 patent classes that our data span perfectly
predict outcomes because they are represented in the data by one or two licenses. The
results of this regression (available upon request) were almost identical to those that
appear in Model 5f.
Given the limits of our data, we were unable to estimate a model that simultaneously
accounted for unobserved heterogeneity and included patent class controls. Thus, while
the results associated with the interaction of remaining patent life and patent strength
and scope support the general thrust of our arguments, we do not have su±cient within-
technology-class variation to conclusively rule out the alternative hypothesis that our
appropriability measures are picking up other sources of technological heterogeneity,
which would re°ect an association between appropriability conditions in line of business
and termination and commercialization hazards. To the extent that such a correlation
might be associated with other unobserved factors, our results must be quali¯ed.
From our robustness analysis, we conclude that the hazard of termination is de-
creasing in PATENT STRENGTH and SECRECY. The hazard of commercialization is
decreasing in LEAD TIME, and increasing in LEARNING, PATENT SCOPE and also
PATENT STRENGTH. Based on Table 1, these results are consistent with the cash-°ow
e®ect dominating the option e®ect on average for the technologies in the sample. Further-
20more, our result for lead time is consistent with the assumption that these technologies
are embryonic inventions for which further development is required.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the e®ects, and following the literature of these
types of competing risks models, we compute the change in the predicted probabilities of
events for the sample. Because the Yale Survey measures are derived from a Likert scale,
we look at the e®ect of a change in one standard deviation from the mean on the predicted
probability of events for the sample. Model 5c predicts both the mean probability of
termination and commercialization for the sample to be 0.12 and 0.10 respectively (all
numbers are rounded to two digits). If each manager in a line of business associated
with each of the inventions had rated the e®ectiveness of patents one standard deviation
higher, the probability of termination for the sample patents would decrease to 0.10, or
21% while the probability of commercialization would increase to 0.13. Similarly, if each
manager had rated secrecy one standard deviation higher, the predicted probability of
termination decreases 12% to 0.11 while the predicted probability of commercialization
increases 16% to 0.11.
We ¯nd that each additional international patent class associated with the patent
(measured by PATENT SCOPE) decreases the mean predicted probability of termination
by 12.5% to 0.11 and increases the mean predicted probability of commercialization to
0.12, which represents an increase of 21%. A one standard deviation change in LEAD
TIME is associated with a reduction in the commercialization probability to 0.08, a 17%
decline. A one standard deviation increase in the importance of LEARNING increases
the probability of commercialization by 25% (the mean predicted probability increases
to 0.12).
6 Concluding remarks
We investigate the role of patents and other appropriability mechanisms in the commer-
cialization of university inventions. An important characteristic of these inventions is
that they typically require further development, which is risky for both technical and
market reasons. In our theoretical discussion, we view a licensee's decision as an optimal
stopping problem in which at every point in time the licensee can decide to either com-
mercialize, drop the license, or keep the license but delay commercialization. This gives
rise to a real option in commercialization. How di®erent appropriability mechanisms af-
fect a ¯rm's decisions depends on their impact on the current market value of the license
and this real option.
21Our empirical analysis applies a competing risks hazard model which allows for cor-
related risks and non-parametric unobserved heterogeneity to a dataset of 805 exclusive
licenses of MIT patents. We ¯nd that the hazard of terminating a license is decreasing in
the e®ectiveness of patent strength and secrecy. One of our most striking results is that,
when lead time is important, it appears to be optimal for ¯rms to delay commercializa-
tion until the licensee has developed the product. In contrast, we ¯nd that patent scope
and learning have a positive e®ect on the hazard of commercialization. These results
suggest that, when pro¯ting from embryonic inventions relies heavily on learning, ¯rms
should commercialize them as soon as is technically feasible.
A few caveats are in order. First, our analysis does not account for the structure
of license agreements. Work by Choi (2001), Jensen and Thursby (2001), Elfenbein
(2005), and Dechenaux et al. (2007) has shown that the structure of payment terms can
a®ect development e®orts by licensees as well as the inventors themselves. Thus, while
considering these e®ects is beyond our scope, we cannot rule out license structure as a
determinant of termination and commercialization. Second, readers are cautioned that
MIT is a unique institution and that the results may not generalize to other universities.
This suggests the merits of future research based on data from other universities, as well
as more ¯ne grained measures of technology characteristics.
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257 Appendix
7.1 A simple model termination and commercialization deci-
sions
Consider the problem of a ¯rm that has exclusively licensed a patented invention from
MIT. Commercializing in period t yields a stream of expected pro¯ts per period whose
discounted sum is equal to ~ ¦t. We refer to it as the market value of the license in
period t. We assume that time is discrete. Before period t, from the point of view of the
licensee, market value is a random variable with cumulative distribution function Ft(~ ¦t).
The distribution of ~ ¦t depends on the time period t, but we assume that realizations of
market value are independent across time periods. In each period, the licensee learns
the current realization ¦t before making any decision.
In addition to market value, in every period before commercialization, the licensee
may earn a bene¯t bt (rents that are unrelated to commercialization) and must pay a
cost ct (further development cost plus licensing fees) if it keeps the license. For instance,
bt will capture the size of the rents the licensee obtains by successfully blocking a rival.
It is not excluded that bt = 0 holds for most of the licenses in our sample.
To characterize the value of the license in a given period t, we assume that there
exists a period L such that Fs(0) = 1 and bs · cs for every s ¸ L. It is clear that
if the ¯rm has neither terminated, nor commercialized by period L, it will terminate
in that period because the value of the license is equal to zero. We now characterize
the value of the license in a given period t by using a standard recursive argument. In
period t = L ¡ 1, the licensee learns the realization of the discounted value of pro¯t
¦L¡1 and must then decide whether to commercialize, keep the license or terminate.
The licensee will commercialize if ¦L¡1 > maxfbL¡1 ¡ cL¡1;0g, it will keep the license
without commercializing if bL¡1 ¡ cL¡1 ¸ maxf¦L¡1;0g and terminate otherwise. The
value of the license is thus ML¡1 = maxf¦L¡1;bL¡1 ¡ cL¡1;0g and its expected value is
equal to EML¡1. In period t = L ¡ 2, the licensee must decide whether to terminate
the license to earn 0, commercialize to earn ¦L¡2 or to keep the license, but delay
commercialization, to earn bL¡2 ¡cL¡2 +±EML¡1. The value of the license is thus equal
to ML¡2 = maxf¦L¡2;bL¡2 ¡ cL¡2 + ±EML¡1;0g and its expected value is equal to
EML¡2. Continuing in the same fashion, it is clear that in period t, the value of the
license is equal to
Mt = maxf¦t;bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1;0g
where Mt+1 is a de¯ned above.
The bene¯t bt surely depends on the strength of some of the appropriability mech-
anisms we consider in the empirical analysis. The term ±EMt+1, which represents the
discounted expected value of the license in the next period, depends on appropriability
mechanisms as well. Hence, in every period t < L, we write the option value of the
26license as follows:
Vt(¦t;bt;ct) = maxf¦t;bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1;0g:
In period t < L, the ¯rm's optimal decision may be summarized as follows:
Commercialize if Vt(¦t;bt;ct) = ¦t
Delay if Vt(¦t;bt;ct) = bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1
Terminate if Vt(¦t;bt;ct) = 0
Put di®erently, the licensee will commercialize if
½
bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 > 0 and ¦t > bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1
or bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 · 0 but ¦t > 0
and it will terminate if and only if both
bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 · 0 and ¦t · 0
Finally, the licensee will delay if and only if
bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 > 0 but ¦t < bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1:
Thus, if it has neither terminated, nor commercialized by period t, the probability that





1 ¡ Ft(bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1) if bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 > 0
1 ¡ Ft(0) if bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 · 0
If it has neither terminated, nor commercialized by period t, the probability that the





0 if bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 > 0
Ft(0) if bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 · 0
If the value of delaying, bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1, is strictly positive, the ¯rm does not
terminate since keeping the license is more pro¯table than terminating it. In this case,
even if pro¯ts from commercializing in period t are low, the ¯rm recognizes that the
license may have su±cient value in the future to justify paying licensing fees. If the license
has no value in the future unless commercialized immediately, bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 · 0,
then the ¯rm will commercialize in the current period as long as it does not make an
overall loss. Otherwise it will terminate. An interesting aspect of the commercialization
decision is that other things constant, a high value of bt ¡ ct + ±EMt+1 will lead to a
lower probability of commercialization.
277.2 Cash-°ow and option e®ect
Our econometric model uses industry-level measures of the e®ectiveness of various ap-
propriability mechanisms to estimate the hazards of termination and commercialization.
In the text, we discuss the relationship between appropriability mechanisms and the
hazards of termination and commercialization in terms of cash-°ow and option e®ects.
We de¯ne theses two e®ects below.
Note that, other things constant, the conditional probability of commercialization
increases if Ft decreases for a given ¦t; that is, if the distribution of the market value
assigns a greater probability to higher realizations. This is similar to what Takalo and
Kanniainen (2000) call the cash °ow e®ect in their model. However, other things con-
stant, the probability of commercialization decreases as bt¡ct+±EMt+1 increases. This
is similar to the option e®ect in Takalo and Kanniainen and we refer to it as such.
The conditional probability of termination in period t also depends on the cash °ow
and the option e®ects. By contrast to commercialization, it is easy to see that the two
e®ects reinforce each other and contribute to decreasing the hazard of termination.
28Figure 1: Unconditional event hazards by period

















29Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Lead Time 5.369 0.506 4 6.13
Secrecy 3.923 0.406 3 4.88
Learning 5.003 0.435 4 5.75
Patent Strength 4.108 0.747 1.75 5.32
Patent Scope 1.339 0.639 1 6
Start-up 0.327 0.469 0 1
Industry Funded 0.168 0.374 0 1
Drug Patent 0.216 0.412 0 1
Chemical Patent 0.311 0.463 0 1
Electric Patent 0.265 0.441 0 1
Mechanical Patent 0.032 0.177 0 1
Other Technology 0.176 0.381 0 1
Remaining Patent Life (17- years since grant) 12.85 3.54 1 17
Remaining Patent Life * Pat. Strength 21.29 14.76 2.73 79.80
Remaining Patent Life * Pat. Scope 6.91 6.17 1 60
N 805
Table 3: Termination, commercialization and right censoring by age of license
Age of License Termination Commercialization Right Censored Total
1 74 49 79 805
2 32 26 48 604
3 54 40 98 497
4 49 20 35 305
5 34 11 34 201
6 8 2 10 122
7 10 6 11 103
8 6 2 9 76
9 0 11 8 59
10 1 0 15 39
11 1 1 7 24
12 0 0 2 15
13 0 0 8 13
14 0 0 2 6
15 0 0 2 4
16 0 0 2 2
Total 269 168 370 2875
30Table 4: Termination, commercialization and right censoring by patent age
Remaining Patent Life Termination First Sale Right Censored Total
17 38 9 2 48
16 38 25 49 112
15 31 15 30 76
14 24 14 36 74
13 37 21 28 85
12 20 8 40 68
11 12 14 26 52
10 15 16 38 69
9 13 14 25 52
8 11 12 21 44
7 12 5 19 36
6 7 7 5 19
5 8 5 4 17
4 3 0 9 12
3 0 1 7 8
2 0 2 15 17
1 0 0 16 16
Total 269 168 370 805
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